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POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND THE DRAFTING OF
MISSOURI WILLS
LYLE M. ALLEN, JR.t
The subject of powers of appointment is often approached by attor-
neys with some trepidation-as something both mysterious and com-
plex. This is probably the result, at least in part, of the fact that the
thinking of the bar about powers of appointment has been colored, and
perhaps confused, by federal estate and gift tax law and, to a lesser
extent, by state inheritance tax statutes. Estate, gift and inheritance
tax statutes have been greatly concerned, in recent years, with powers
of appointment, and have brought into the law their own special defi-
nitions of powers and special rules regarding them which differ in
many instances from the property law rules.
Unquestionably, powers of appointment have become increasingly
important, especially in will drafting, because of tax legislation. The
Federal Revenue Act of 1948 brought the marital deduction into the
estate tax law, and, as all attorneys know, one of the standard methods
of qualifying property for the marital deduction is the creation of a
testamentary "power-of-appointment trust" meeting the requirements
of section 2056(b) (5)2 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.3 Since
1951, powers of appointment have assumed an even more prominent
place in will drafting and estate planning because of the amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 made by the Powers of Appoint-
ment Act of 1951. 4 These amendments have been carried over, vir-
tually without change, into the estate and gift tax provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 By making fewer powers subject to
t Member of the Missouri and Federal Bars.1. 62 STAT. 117 (1948), 26 U.S.C. § 812 (1952).
2. This section, with some liberalizing changes, is the equivalent of the
INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 812 (e) (1) (F). See SEN. REP. No. 1622 83d Cong 2d
Sess. 1635 (1954). One of the liberalizing changes made by the iNT. REV. oD
of 1954 is to permit a "specific portion" of a trust to qualify for the marital de-
duction. Under the INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 812(e) (1) (F), the surviving
spouse had to have a power of appointment over the "entire corpus."
3. Pub. L. No. 591, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 16, 1954).
4. 65 STAT. 91 (1951), 26 U.S.C. § 811 (1952).
5. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1635 (1954). The new Code does
contain some new provisions, however, with respect to powers of appointment.See, e.g., INT. Rzv. CoD of 1954, § 674(b) (3), providing that a power to ap-
point by will only, other than a power to appoint accumulated income, will be
excepted from the general rule of § 674(a), which provides that the grantor of
a living trust will be taxed on the income from a trust, the enjoyment of the
corpus and income of which is subject to a power of disposition exercisable by
the grantor; § 674(b) (6), excepting from the general rule of § 674(a) a power
to distribute to or accumulate income for an income beneficiary where the bene-
ficiary has a broad special power of appointment over accumulated income; and§ 2503 (b), providing that a gift to a minor will not be considered a gift of a
future interest and therefore will qualify for the $3,000 annual exclusion from
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estate and gift taxes, the 1951 amendments permit greater use of
powers of appointment in wills, with resultant greater flexibility in
the disposition of estates. Thus, for example, it is possible for prop-
erty to be left in trust for the life of a person and to give the life
beneficiary the power to determine how the property shall be distrib-
uted upon his death on the basis of circumstances then existing, al-
most as if the life beneficiary were the absolute owner of the property
but without a second estate tax on it at his death.
Although often overshadowed in recent years by the tax rules re-
garding powers of appointment, some of the common law rules regard-
ing powers contribute particularly to their usefulness in will drafting.
Thus, at common law, with the exception of the case where the donor
and the donee of the power are the same person," creditors of the donee
or of his estate cannot reach property over which the donee had a
special power of appointment,7 whether exercised or not. This is also
true of property over which he had an unexercised general power,"
although property subject to a general power which is exercised in
favor of one who is not a purchaser for value or in favor of one of
several creditors can be subjected to the claims of creditors if other
property of the donee is insufficient.9 The Federal Bankruptcy Act,
section 110(a), provides that the trustee in bankruptcy of the donee
of a power of appointment shall be vested, by operation of law, with
the title of the bankrupt to "powers which he might have exercised for
his own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised solely for
some other person... ,,,10 but the courts have held that a general
power to appoint by will only is not within the terms of the statute.1
Another common law rule increasing the usefulness of powers in
will drafting is the rule that the surviving spouse of the donee of the
power is not entitled to dower or other similar marital rights in the
property subject to the power whether the power is general or special
and whether it is exercised or not exercised.12
gift tax, provided, among other conditions specified in § 2503(c), that in
the event that the donee dies before attaining majority any unexpended portion
of the property and income will be payable to his estate "or as he may appoint
under a general power of appointment as defined in section 2514(c)."
6. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 328 (1948). Unless otherwise noted, whenever
the Restatement is cited herein, no Missouri case has been found on the particu-
lar point and the Restatement rule is believed to represent the majority rule in
the United States.
7. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 326 (1940).
8. See Krause v. Jeannette Investment Co., 333 Mo. 509, 517, 62 S.W.2d 890,893 (1933); see also RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 327 (1940).
9. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 329 (1940); see also RzSTATEMiENT, PROPERTY
§ 330 (1940).
10. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (1953).
I1. See, e.g., Montague v. Silsbee, 218 Mass. 107, 105 N.E. 611 (1914); In re
Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 692, 32 N.W.2d 14 (1948).
12. Krause v. Jeannette Investment Co., 333 Mo. 509, 62 S.W.2d 890 (1933);
RESTATEMENT, PROPRTY § 332, comment a (1940). But cf. Link v. Edmondson,
19 Mo. 487 (1854) semble.
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. Accordingly, by the use of a power of appointment, a testator can
often achieve flexibility in the ultimate disposition of his estate based
upon circumstances existing long aftir his death and at the same time
avoid having the appointive property subject to dower and creditors'
rights. Moreover, if the power is not a general one within the defini-
tion of the federal estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, he can also avoid a second estate tax upon the appointive
property at the death of the possessor of the power. In many instances
there is no other device by which these things can be accomplished,
at least so effectively.
I. DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS MOST
INVOLVED IN WILL DRAFTING
Before getting into specific will drafting problems involving powers
of appointment, it is necessary to review briefly the definitions and
classifications of powers with which attorneys are most concerned in
drafting wills.
A. Definition of Power of Appointment
The Restatement of Property defines a power of appointment as
a power created or reserved by a person (the donor) having
property subject to his disposition enabling the donee of the power
to designate, within such limits as the donor may prescribe, the
transferees of the property or the shares in which it shall be re-
ceived."'
The persons to whom interests in the property are appointed by the
donee are called the "appointees," and the persons who will receive
property not effectively appointed are the "takers in default of ap-
pointment."14
The term "power of appointment" does not include a power of sale,
a power of attorney, a power reserved to the grantor of a trust to
revoke the trust, or a trustee's discretion to determine how much of
the income or corpus of the trust shall be used for a particular bene-
ficiary or for particular members of a group of beneficiaries, usually
in accordance with some standard."3 Furthermore, at common law, the
term "power of appointment" does not include a power to cause a gift
of income to be augmented out of principal16 However, as will be dis-
cussed later in this article, many powers to augment a gift of income
out of principal are treated as powers of appointment for federal
estate and gift tax purposes.
13. RESTATEMNT, PROPETY § 318 (1940).
14. Id. § 319.
15. Id. § 318, esp. comment 1.
16. Id. § 318, and comment j.
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B. Classifications Primarily Involved in Will Drafting
Powers of appointment are classified by the common law in many
ways, but only two classifications are primarily involved in the draft-
ing of wills, that of the manner in which a power can be exercised and
that of the scope of the power granted. Consequently, a number of
types of powers, such as "powers in gross," "powers collateral" and
"powers appendant," will not be discussed in this article, and others
will be discussed only incidentally in connection with specific will
drafting problems.
1. Manner in Which Power Is Exercisable
The first classification with which attorneys are primarily concerned
in will drafting has to do with the manner in which the power can be
exercised. Powers of appointment can be exercisable by deed during
lifetime, by will, or by either will or deed, depending upon what the
instrument creating the power provides.'7 The Restatement of Prop-
erty terms powers that are exercisable by deed, or by either deed or
will, powers "presently exercisable."' 8 Powers to appoint by will only
are often called "testamentary powers."1
The method by which a power can be exercised should not be con-
fused with the method by which it is created. Although powers of
appointment can, of course, be created by almost any instrument used
to transfer property interests-by will or by deed or by inter vivos
indenture or declaration of trust-the manner in which a power is
created is relatively unimportant in determining the common law
incidents of the power. The manner in which it may be exercised is
important, since the rules of law applicable to the power may differ,
depending upon whether it is exercisable by deed or by will.
2. General Power c. Special Power
The other important classification of powers in the law of property
so far as will drafting is concerned is that which classifies a power as
a "general power" or a "special power." A power is general if it can
be exercised wholly in favor of the donee, in the case of a power ex-
ercisable before death, or can be exercised wholly in favor of the
donee's estate, in the case of a testamentary power, regardless, in each
case, of whether the power can be exercised in favor of other persons.2 0
A power is special if it can be exercised only in favor of persons other
than the donee who constitute a group not unreasonably large.21 An
17. Id. § 321.
18, Id. § 321, comment d.
19. Id, § 321.
20. Id. § 320.
21. Ibid.
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example of a special power would be a power given to an individual to
appoint by his will certain designated property to his children. Special
powers are sometimes called "limited powers."22 Of course, either a
special power or a general power may be exercisable by deed or ,vill or
both, depending upon the terms of the instrument creating the power.
It should be borne in mind that the foregoing are property law
definitions of powers of appointment. The tax law definitions, the
most important of which are discussed below, differ in a number of
respects, particularly in the scope of the definition of a general power
for federal estate and gift tax purposes.
It also should be mentioned at this point that powers of appoint-
ment have been the subject of statutory treatment for various non-tax
purposes in a number of states, but not in Missouri. Except for the
section involving Missouri inheritance tax with respect to appointive
property,23 there is no statutory law in Missouri dealing with powers
of appointment.
II. CREATING BY WILL A PowER Or APPOINTMENT
The will draftsman and his client must first determine, of course,
whether it is desirable to confer a power of appointment by the will
being drafted. Then, if the decision is made to create such a power,
the attorney becomes concerned with the various problems involved
in drafting it.
A. Determining When to Create a General Power
General powers of appointment are created in a variety of situa-
tions.
1. Marital Deduction Trust
The bar is now quite familiar with the "power-of-appointment
trust" used to qualify property for the marital deduction for federal
estate tax purposes.2 4 One of the requirements of such a trust is that
the surviving spouse must have a power of appointment over the en-
tire corpus, or a specific portion thereof. Under the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the power must be exercisable
in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviv-
ing spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each case the
power is exercisable in favor of others . . . with no power in any
other person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific
portion, to any person other than the surviving spouse.25
22. RE STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 320, comment c (1940).
23. No. REv. STAT. § 145.030 (1949).
24. As a result of the changes in the federal estate tax law made by the new
Code, a legal life estate with power of appointment of the specified type will now
qualify for the marital deduction, as well as a life estate in trust with such a
power of appointment. INT. RE v. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
25. Ibid.
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The surviving spouse's power, "whether exercisable by will or during
life," must be "exercisable by such spouse alone and in all events.""6
Meeting the definition of a general power in the powers of appoint-
ment sectionl of the estate tax law is not enough to qualify the trust
for the marital deduction; all the requirements of section 2056 (b) (5)
of the Internal Revenue Code must be met.
Detailed discussion of the marital deduction in general, and even
of the requirements of a "power-of-appointment trust" for purposes of
the marital deduction, is beyond the scope of this article, but since the
most frequently encountered power today is the power of appointment
used in connection with such a trust, a brief discussion of such powers
of appointment appears not to be out of place.
A clause which has been used in a number of wills for the purpose
of giving a surviving spouse a qualifying testamentary power over the
corpus of a marital-deduction trust is the following:
Upon the death of my wife, -..................---------- , the trustees
shall distribute all the money and other property then constituting
this trust estate unto such persons and in such proportions or
amounts as my wife shall have directed by her last will and testa-
ment specifically referring to the power of appointment hereby
conferred upon her, it being my intention hereby to confer upon
my wife an unqualified power, exercisable by her alone and in all
events, to appoint by her last will and testament the entire corpus
of this trust estate, free of the trust, unto such persons, including
the estate of my wife, and in such proportions or amounts as she
may direct.
In the event that my wife shall fail to exercise the aforesaid
power of appointment or shall fail to appoint all the money and
other property constituting the trust estate at her death, then in
either such case, upon the death of my wife, all the money and
other property of this trust estate with respect to which my wife
shall have failed to exercise such power of appointment shall ...
[disposition to takers in default of exercise of the power should
follow].
The Treasury Regulations under the 1939 Code provide that formal
limitations on the power given to a surviving spouse will not dis-
qualify the trust, that is, such limitations as the requirement that the
power must be exercised by a will executed by the surviving spouse
after the decedent's death or that the exercise must be by a specific
reference to the power.28
It is just as important in the case of the power of appointment for
purposes of the marital deduction as in the case of any other power of
appointment to provide takers in default of exercise, a subject dis-
cussed at greater length elsewhere in this article. Many marital-
26. Ibid.
27. Id. § 2041(b) (1).
28. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47(a) (1949).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss4/2
414 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
deduction trusts provide that, in default of exercise of the power, the
corpus of the trust shall be disposed of in the same manner as the
corpus of another trust created by the will. Wills often provide that
the unappointed property be poured over into a trust of the remainder
of the testator's residuary estate (a so-called conventional trust) ; the
will directs the addition of the unappointed property to the conven-
tional trust at the surviving spouse's death, or incorporates by refer-
ence in the marital-deduction trust the provisions of the conventional
trust.
2. Situations Not Involving the Marital Deduction
In cases other than those involving a marital-deduction trust, a
general power of appointment may be desirable for the purpose of
permitting the donee to obtain the property or the income therefrom
by exercise of the power, if he needs the property or income, but to let
others have it in the meantime.
Of course, conferring a general power of appointment will create
estate tax problems for the donee, unless the amount of the appointive
property and the donee's own estate together are less than the $60,000
specific exemption from federal estate tax.20 Under the amendments
made to the estate tax law by the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951,
which have been carried over, virtually without change, into the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954,30 and which replaced retroactively the
difficult, artificial and restrictive rules brought into the law by section
403 of the Revenue Act of 1942,31 if a general power, as defined by the
Powers of Appointment Act amendments, is created 2 after October
21, 1942,33 the appointive property is included in the donee's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes whether or not the power is
exercised.3 4
A general power of appointment, for estate tax purposes, is defined,
29. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2052.
30. See note 5 supra.
31. 56 STAT. 798 (1942), 26 U.S.C. § 811(f) (1952). This legislation had in
turn replaced the rule under Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(f), 44 STAT. 24 (1926),
as anlended by the Revenue Act of 193, 802(b), 47 STAT. 279 (1932), which
subjected to estate tax only "property passing under a general power of appoint-
ment exercised by the decedent [donee]."
32. INT. R v. CODE of 1954, § 2041(b) (3), contains a special provision to the
effect that a power of appointment created by a will executed on or before
October 21, 1942, shall not be considered a power created after that date if the
testator died before July 1, 1949, without having republished his will, by codicil
or otherwise, after October 21, 1942.
33. The present law treats differently powers created on or before October 21,
1942. If a general power was created on or before that date, the apointive
property is includible in the donee's gross estate for estate tax only if the power
is exercised and only if it is general, that is, only if it is exercisable in favor of
the donee, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate, and is exercisable
by the donee alone and not in conjunction with any other person. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2041 (a) (1) and § 2041(b) (1) (B).
34 Id. § 2041(a) (2).
Washington University Open Scholarship
POWER OF APPOINTMENT
with a few exceptions,5 as one that is exercisable in favor of the donee,
his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate28 Property sub-
ject to a general power created after October 21, 1942, will also be
includible in the donee's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes
if he has exercised or released the power by an inter vivos disposition
of such nature that, if it were a transfer of the donee's own property,
the property would be includible in the donee's estate as constitut-
ing a transfer within the meaning of sections 2035 to 2038, inclusive,
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, such as a transfer in contem-
plation of death or because of the reservation of powers or interests
by the transferor, e.g., the right to income or the power to alter, amend
or revoke the transfer.
The estate tax law expressly excludes from the definition of a gen-
eral power of appointment a power "to consume, invade, or appro-
priate property for the benefit of the decedent [donee] which is limited
by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support,
or maintenance of the decedent... .,, 7 The question arises, of course,
as to what is an "ascertainable standard." Presumably, a power of en-
croachment to maintain and support the life beneficiary of a trust "in
the manner and at the standard of living to which he was accustomed
during the life" of the testator, donor of the power, would be limited
by "an ascertainable standard"; hence, the life beneficiary would not
be considered the donee of a general power. On the other hand, by
analogy to the charitable deduction cases, a power of encroachment for
a beneficiary's "comfort" or "pleasure" or "happiness" would clearly
not be governed by an ascertainable standard-s
Giving the donee a general power which permits him to obtain the
property or the income therefrom by exercise of the power if he should
need it, but to let others have it in the meantime, may also create gift
tax problems for the donee of the power. This is because the gift tax
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code substantially parallel the
estate tax provisions, including those defining a general power, the
35. Among the exceptions are those of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2041(b) (1)(C), excluding in whole or in part from the definition of a general power certainjoint powers. These exceptions provide in substance that if the power is not
exercisable except in conjunction with the donor of the power, the power is not
deemed a general power; that if the power is not exercisable except in conjunc-
tion with a person having a substantial interest in the appointive property which
is adverse to the exercise of the power in favor of the donee, his estate, his
creditors, or the creditors of his estate, the power is not deemed to be a general
power; and that if a Joint power is not excluded from the definition of a general
power under the foregoing rules, it will be deemed to be a general power only
as to a fractional part of the appointive property if some or all of the property
may be appointed in favor of other co-holders of the power.
36. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2041(b) (1).
37. Id. § 2041(b) (1) (A).
38. Cf. Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595 (1949); Merchants
National Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943).
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provisions concerning lapse of powers (discussed below), those con-
cerning the time of creation of powers, and the special provisions as
to joint powers.39 If a general power was created after October 21,
1942, the exercise or release thereof is a taxable gift.
40
Moreover, a general power in the circumstances mentioned may
even cause the income from the appointive property to be taxed to the
donee for income tax purposes, although the writer has found no de-
cided cases which have gone quite that far as yet. In Mallinckrodt v.
Nrna,4 1 the beneficiary of an irrevocable living trust, created by his
father, was held taxable upon the income of the trust under section
22(a) of the 1939 Code even though the income had not been paid to
him. The ground given for the decision was that the trust provided
that the income was to be paid to the beneficiary upon his request. The
language of the court's decision seems broad enough to cause the in-
come of a testamentary, trust to be taxed to a beneficiary given the
same power to request the income:
It seems to us, as it did to the majority of the Tax Court, that it
is the possession of power over the disposition of trust income
which is of significance in determining whether, under section
22 (a), the income is taxable to the possessor of such power, and
that logically it makes no difference whether the possessor is a
grantor who retained the power or a beneficiary who acquired
it from another.42
The so-called Mallinckrodt Regulations under the 1939 Code are not,
by their terms, limited to inter vivos trusts, although they do use the
term "grantor," a term normally used with respect to living trusts,
in providing that where
a person other than the grantor of property transferred in trust
has a power exercisable solely by himself to vest the corpus or the
income therefrom in himself, the income therefrom shall be in-
cluded in computing the net income of such person.43
The section of the new Code 4 which codifies the Mallinckrodt Regula-
tions, with some exceptions, likewise is not expressly limited by its
terms to living trusts, although it similarly uses the term "grantor."
On the brighter side of the picture for the taxpayer, it does not seem
to make any difference, so far as the Missouri inheritance tax is con-
cerned, whether a power is general or special, for the inheritance tax
statute on its face purports to apply to the devolution of property upon
the exercise or non-exercise of any power, general or special. 4"
Despite the federal tax disadvantages of a general power, a general
39. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2514.
40. Id. § 25d14(b).
41. 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945).
42. Id. at 5.
43. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-22 (1953).
44. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 678.
45. Mo. REv. STAT. § 145.030 (1949).
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power may sometimes be desirable, because of peculiar circumstances,
even in situations not involving the marital deduction. Of course the
tax disadvantages in such cases should be carefully pointed out to the
testator-client, so that he can make the final decision with them in
mind.
3. Powers Inadvertently Created
Because of the breadth of the definition of a general power of ap-
pointment in the federal estate and gift tax law, the attorney-drafts-
man must use great care in drafting conventional trusts where rights
of withdrawal or encroachment are to be given, even though he does
not intend to place in the trust what is normally thought of as a power
of appointment.
a. Rights of Withdrawal
If a life beneficiary of a trust is given an unlimited right of with-
drawal-that is, a right to demand the payment of corpus to himself
without conditions, limitations or restrictions-he undoubtedly has a
general power of appointment for federal estateO and gift' tax pur-
poses. Even if the beneficiary is given a right of withdrawal limited
to a specified amount annually, the life beneficiary may have estate
and gift tax problems. One of the most difficult features of the 1942
estate and gift tax legislation, as to powers, concerned the power often
given to an income beneficiary to withdraw a stated amount of capital
each year from the trust corpus with provision for the power to lapse
at the end of the year, if not exercised. If the income beneficiary per-
mitted the power to lapse, would he thereby make a gift at the end of
the year to the remaindermen of the amount which he could have
taken less the value of his life interest therein? If so, it would be a
gift of a future interest not qualifying for the $3000 annual exclusion
from gift tax.48 If the beneficiary-donee did make such a gift, would
not the amount thereof be also includible in his gross estate for federal
estate tax at his death, under section 811 (c) of the 1939 Code, as a
transfer with income reserved by the transferor or a transfer in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death?
The present law, embodying the amendments made by the Powers of
Appointment Act of 1951, eliminates some of these problems. Now,
if an annual right of withdrawal was created on or before October 21,
1942, failure to exercise the right does not have estate or gift tax
consequence. 49 If an annual right of withdrawal was created after
October 21, 1942, lapse of the power at the end of the year, because
not exercised, is not deemed a release of the power and therefore is
46. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(a) (1954).
47. US. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(b) (1954).
48. INT. REv. Cons of 1939, § 1003(b) (3).
49. INT. REv. Cosm of 1954, § 2041(a) (1) (estate tax) and § 2514(a) (gift
tax).
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not taxable for estate or gift tax purposes unless the appointive prop-
erty, that is, the property which could have been withdrawn but was
not, exceeds in value, at the time of lapse, the greater of $5000 or 5%
of the aggregate value of the corpus at the time of lapse, and then
only to the extent that the amount which could have been withdrawn
but was not exceeds this limit."
In other words, if the power is to draw $5000 or less per year from
corpus, the holder of the power need not be concerned about the estate
and gift tax consequences of letting the power lapse by non-exercise,
and this is true also if the power is to draw annually no more than
5% of the corpus of the trust. If the unexercised power permits with-
drawal of more than the greater of $5000 or 5% of the corpus of the
trust, estate and gift tax liability is incurred, but only with respect to
the amount by which the property which could have been withdrawn
exceeds the $5000 or 5% limit.51
Estate and gift tax problems in connection with rights of with-
drawal given to a life beneficiary of a trust can, therefore, be avoided
by limiting the amount which can be withdrawn each year to $5000
or 5% of the value of the corpus. This could be accomplished by a
clause something like the following:
I direct the trustees to pay over to my wife, ... .................. ,
free of trust, out of the corpus of the trust estate, such sums of
money or other assets as my wife may at any time and from time
to time during her lifetime request the trustees in writing to pay
over to her, but my wife shall have no right to withdraw from the
corpus of the trust estate, in any one calendar year, money or
other property which shall exceed in value or amount, in the ag-
gregate, the greater of Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00) or five
per cent (5%) of the aggregate value, at the end of such calendar
year, of the assets then constituting the corpus of the trust estate,
and the right of withdrawal from the corpus of the trust estate
herein conferred upon my wife shall not be cumulative from year
to year.
b. Powers of Encroachment
Estate and gift tax problems can also be created for a trust bene-
ficiary if a power is conferred to encroach upon the corpus for emer-
gencies or for the life beneficiary's support in the event that income
from the trust is insufficient, or upon some other condition, and that
power is given either: (a) to the beneficiary alone; or (b) to the
trustees and the beneficiary happens to be one of the co-trustees, if the
other co-trustees do not have an interest adverse to that of the bene-
ficiary. Of course, if the encroachment power given to the beneficiary
or to the trustees is limited by "an ascertainable standard relating to
the health, education, support, or maintenance" of the beneficiary,
50. INT. Riv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2041 (b) (2) (estate tax) and § 2514(e) (gift
tax).
51. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1954).
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there is no problem, since, as noted above, such a power is expressly
excluded from the definition of a general power for both estate -52 and
giftI tax purposes. The problem as to what constitutes "an ascertain-
able standard" has been discussed briefly above."*
If the testator does not wish to use an ascertainable standard but
wants greater flexibility so that encroachment upon corpus can be
made for such things as the beneficiary's "comfort" or "welfare," the
safest course to follow in drafting the will is to give the encroachment
powers to the trustees and to provide that the beneficiary, if he is a
co-trustee, shall not participate in any way in the decision of the
trustees as to encroachment. This could be done by a clause some-
thing like the following:
In the event that my wife -.............----------- , shall, at the
time of any such alleged need affecting her, be acting as co-trustee
hereunder, then in such case, notwithstanding anything herein-
above contained, the discretion herein conferred to encroach upon
the corpus of the trust estate shall be exercised exclusively by the
other co-trustees or co-trustee then acting, without participation
by my wife in the consideration by the trustees of the propriety
or the amount of such encroachment, the other co-trustees or co-
trustee being given sole and exclusive discretion with respect
thereto and full authority to make any and all payments and dis-
tributions pursuant to such encroachment.
Perhaps the most conservative course would be to follow this pro-
cedure even when the draftsman thinks that there is an ascertainable
standard, until court decisions throw more light upon the subject.
One writer suggests that this course be followed also where a father
is named as co-trustee of a share left in trust for his minor child and
the trustees are given powers of encroachment, lest it be contended
by the Internal Revenue Service that since the father had the power,
as a co-trustee, to apply principal as well as income to the use of his
minor child in discharge of his duty to support his child, he has, in
effect, a power to appoint to himself.55 Accordingly, he suggests that
the authority be vested solely in the other co-trustees. 56
B. Drafting Special Powers
1. Determining When to Create a Special Power
What are some of the considerations in determining whether or not
to create a special power of appointment?
Special powers can be used in many situations to give flexibility in
the disposition of property after a life estate based upon circumstances
52. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041(b) (1) (A).
53. Id § 2514(c) (1).
54. See text at II (A) (2) supra.
55. Trachtman, Estate Planning in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CURRENT PROB-
LEMS IN FEDERAL TAXATION SEIuES 168 (1951).
56. Ibid.
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as they exist at that time and yet avoid some of the tax problems in-
herent in a general power.
When a testator creates a life estate he does not know what the
circumstances of his family will be at the death of the life tenant.
Some relatives, because of illness or misfortune, may be in much
greater need than others. One child may have polio, or may have been
left a destitute widow with small children. Another may have married
a wealthy husband or wife and therefore be in very high income tax
brackets, so that much of any additional income would be taxed away.
One grandchild may have proved to be a spendthrift, so that his share
would be best placed in a spendthrift trust, whereas another grand-
child may have shown himself to be a good businessman and may be
in need of cash to go into business for himself. The testator, there-
fore, may want to give the life tenant, or some other person in whose
judgment he has confidence, a special power of appointment over the
remainder, so that at the end of the life tenancy the property can be
appointed on the basis of circumstances as they then exist, rather than
upon the basis of circumstances existing at the time of the testator's
death. Whether the testator wants to create a special power of ap-
pointment for such purposes is, of course, an individual decision which
he alone can make, and he alone must determine the scope of any
special power which he desires to create.
2. Drafting the Special Power
In drafting a special power of appointment there are a number of
things to observe, although perhaps they could all be lumped under
the general heading "good draftsmanship." Some of these things are
equally applicable to the drafting of general powers, while others obvi-
ously are involved only with special powers of appointment.
a. Definiteness as to Permissible Appointees
One thing which should always be observed in drafting a special
power is to be as definite as possible as to who are permissible ap-
pointees. If the spouse or descendants of any member of a designated
class of appointees who may be deceased at the time of appointment
may be included as appointees, the will should expressly so state.
b. "Exctusive" Power v. "Non-Exclusive" Power
The draftsman should also be very clear and precise in drafting a
special power as to whether the power is to be "exclusive" or "non-
exclusive"T-that is, whether the donee, in making appointments in
exercise of the power, can completely exclude a member of a desig-
nated class of permissible appointees. The doctrine of non-exclusive
57. RESTATE=mNT, PROEMMTY § 360 (1940).
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powers was recognized by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Von
Behrn v. Stoeppelmann,/' where, as dictum, the court said that a power
to appoint" ' unto my children.., to be divided as my wife may direct
by will or otherwise . . .'" was a non-exclusive power, so that the
wife could not exclude any of the children. The court there held, how-
ever, that grandchildren of the testator, the children of a child de-
ceased at the time of appointment, had no right to have anything
appointed to them and that, accordingly, the exercise in question was
valid.
The Restatement of Property adopts the rule that:
[T]he donee of a special power may, by an otherwise effective
appointment, exclude one or more objects of the power from dis-
tribution of the property covered thereby, unless the donor mani-
fests a contrary intent.59
Nevertheless, to avoid any possible doubt, where an exclusive power is
intended, it would seem desirable to spell out the donor's intention60
If, in drafting a special power of appointment exercisable in favor
of children, the draftsman says "among my children," it is not clear
whether the power is exclusive or non-exclusive. It would be better to
say "among all of my children," if the power is to be non-exclusive,
or to say "to such one or more of my children to the exclusion of
others," if the power is to be exclusive.
c. Specification of Minimum Amount to be Appointed
Another thing which might well be done if a special power is to be
non-exclusive is to specify a minimum amount or percentage of the
appointive property to be given to each member of the class of ap-
pointees, so as to avoid the problems which have arisen from the
doctrine of "illusory appointments," which are held in equity to be
invalid. This is a doctrine or rule of law, in some jurisdictions, to
the effect that the donee of a non-exclusive special power of appoint-
ment will be held to have perpetrated a fraud upon the donor of the
power if he gives a merely nominal share to one of the possible ap-
pointees under the non-exclusive power.6
The Supreme Court of Missouri said in Fies v. Fries62 that it dis-
approved of the entire doctrine of illusory appointments, but this was
dictum in that case, and the writer has found no case actually holding
that the doctrine is not in force in Missouri63 In the absence of any
58. 286 Mo. 83, 86, 226 S.W. 875, 878 (1920).
59. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 360 (1940).
60. Id. § 360, comment d.
61. Id. § 361.
62. 306 Mo. 101, 109, 267 S.W. 116, 118 (1924).
63. See e.g. Von Behrn v. Stoeppehnann, 286 Mo. 83, 93, 226 S.W. 875, 880(1920), where the court refused to pass upon the question of whether the doc-
trine of illusory appointments was in force in Missouri.
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Missouri decision upon the point, and particularly since the Restate-
ment of Property adopts the illusory appointments doctrine,0' it ap-
pears desirable to specify a minimum amount or percentage to be
given to each member of a designated class of permissible appointees
if the testator desires a special power to be non-exclusive.
d. Specification that Appointments in Trust May Be Made
The general rule is that the donee of a general power can make
appointments in trust, as well as outright appointments, even if the
teans of the instrument creating the power prohibit him from mak-
ing appointments in trust;8 ' and the donee of a special power can
make appointments in trust unless prohibited from so doing by the
instrument creating the power.80 Nevertheless, in the absence of
Missouri precedent, if the testator desires the donee to have the right
to appoint in trust, it would probably be good draftsmanship to spell
out this right, particularly in the case of special powers.
e. Express Exclusion of Donee, His Estate, etc.
As pointed out above, a general power is defined in the federal estate
and gift tax law, with some exceptions, as a power which is exer-
cisable "in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the credi-
tors of his estate."8' To avoid possible taxation of the power as a
general power, particularly if the scope of permissible appointments
under the power is quite broad, it is often desirable, in drafting the
special power, expressly to exclude, as possible appointees, the donee,
his estate, his creditors and the creditors of his estate.
f. Naming of Takers in Default
Another suggestion in connection with the drafting of special
powers is that takers in default of exercise of the power should always
be named. A gift in default is desirable, not only because the person
creating the power may have specific wishes in the matter, but also
because, as a result of the doctrine of "powers in trust,"08 where a
special power is not exercised and there is no express gift in default,
litigation can easily arise as to whether the appointive property passes
to all members of the class of permissible appointees or reverts to the
heirs at law or residuary devisees of the creator of the power. A
power in trust is a special power which the donee is under a duty to
exercise at some time and in some way. 9 If the court determines an
64. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 361 (1940).
65. Id. § 356, comment b.
66. Id. § 358.
67. See note 36 supra.
68. See Von Behrn v. Stoeppelmann, 286 No. 83, 226 S.W. 875 (1920) (recog-
nizing the doctrine of powers in trust).
69. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS_ 27, comment b (1935). However, it should be
noted that RESTATEMEsNT OF TRUSTS § 27, comment c, points out a difficulty in
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unexercised power to be a power in trust, it will usually hold that all
members of the class of possible appointees are entitled to the appoin-
tive property in equal shares.70 It is quite apparent how easily litiga-
tion can arise when a special power is not exercised and no takers in
default have been named in the instrument creating the power.
g.. Express Authorization of Release of Power
In drafting a special power, or, perhaps even more important, in
drafting a general power, it may be desirable to include a provision
authorizing release of the power by the donee and specifying the
mechanics of release. The release of a power of appointment, which
should not be confused with disclaimer (discussed below) ,7 may be
likened to the giving of a quitclaim deed to property, to use a rough
analogy. It means giving up something which the donee accepted and
possessed. The federal estate and gift tax laws do not tax disclaimers
of powers of appointment 7 2 but the gift tax does apply to releases of
general powers created after October 21, 1942/ 7 and the estate tax is
also involved in some releases of such powers.74
Under the 1942 estate and gift tax legislation as to powers, there
was a provision, repeatedly extended until 1951, whereby certain
powers of appointment could be released tax-free, either completely or
partially, so as to cut them down to non-taxable powers.7 5 Some tax-
free releases of powers were also permitted under the amendments to
the estate and gift tax law made by the Powers of Appointment Act of
1951 for a brief "grace period" after enactment of the amendments. 8
Today, there are no provisions for tax-free releases of powers, but
it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the estate and gift tax
law may be amended in the future to permit some tax-free releases
of general powers. In view of this possibility, in creating a general
power, and perhaps also in creating a special power, since the estate
and gift tax law may be otherwise amended in the future to tax some
special powers, it may be desirable to include a provision expressly
authorizing release of the power by the donee and specifying the
mechanics of release, even though a power of appointment is generally
releasable at common law77 except, in the case of special powers, where
ascertaining takers upon non-exercise of a power which does not name takers in
default even when the power is not one in trust.
70. RSTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 27, comment b (1935).
71. See text at ITT(A) (1) (a) infra.
72. Ibid.
73. TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2514(b).
74. Id. § 2041 (a) (2).
75. Revenue Act of 1942. " 403(d) (3) and 452, 56 STAT. 944, 952 (1942), as
amended by 64 STAT. 260 (1950).
76. TNT. REV. CODE of 1939, §§ 811(f) (1) and 1000(c) (1).
77. RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY § 334 (1940) (general powers); RESTATnhiENT,
PROPERTY § 335 (1948) (special powers). The latter represents a change from
the rule orlinnally adopted in the Restatement.
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the donor manifests a contrary intention.7 8 Indeed, the Treasury
Regulations under the 1939 Code provide, for both estate and gift
taxes, that
it is assumed that all general powers of appointment are releas-
able, unless the local law on the subject is to the contrary, and it
is presumed that the method employed to release the power is
effective unless it is not in accordance with the local law relatingspecif cally to releases or in the absence of such local law, is not in
accordance with the local law relating to similar transactions 7
Despite these provisions in the regulations under the 1939 Code,
because of the possibility that some interested party might contend
that the power is not releasable, there would seem to be no harm, in
general, in providing, in a will creating a power of appointment, that
the donee of the power can release it in whole or in part and in speci-
fying the mechanics of release. Some such clause as the following
might be sufficient to accomplish this:
Any person upon whom a power of appointment is conferred by
the next preceding paragraph of this testament may, at any time
during his or her lifetime, release such power of appointment
with respect to any or all of the property subject thereto and may,
at any time and from time to time, limit or further limit the ap-
pointees in whose favor such power may be exercised, any such
release or limitation to be by instrument in writing executed and
acknowledged by the donee of the power in the manner required
by the laws of the State of Missouri for a conveyance of real prop-
erty and delivered to the then-acting trustees hereunder.
h. Illustrative Clauses
Perhaps some of the problems which should be watched for and
considered in the drafting of special powers will be pointed up by
illustrative will clauses creating special powers of appointment.
For example, a clause creating a special power, exercisable by will,
to appoint to descendants of the donee, with provision for takers in
default of appointment, could read something like this:
Upon the death of such child, the trustees shall forthwith dis-
tribute, free of this trust, all the money and other property then
constituting his or her share of the trust estate unto or for the
benefit of such child's descendants, or such one or more of them to
the exclusion of others, and in such proportions or amounts and
upon such trusts, if any, and upon such other conditions, as such
child shall have appointed and directed by his or her last will and
testament.
In the event that such child shall fail to exercise the aforesaid
power of appointment or shall fail to appoint all the money and
other property constituting his or her share at his or her death,
78. RESTATFMVNT, PROPERTY § 335 (1948).
79. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24 (1954) (estate tax regulations); U.S. Treas.
Reg. 108, § 86.2 (1954) (gift tax regulations, identical in substance with estate
tax regulations).
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then in either such case, all the money and other property in re-
spect of which such child shall have failed to exercise such power
of appointment shall . . [followed by provisions specifying
takers in default].
A clause creating a conditional special power to appoint to any per-
son except the donee, his estate, and the creditors of the donee and of
his estate (the purpose of these exclusions being, of course, to prevent
federal estate and gift taxation of the power as a general power)
could provide:
If such child shall leave no descendant him or her surviving,
such child's share shall be paid over and distributed, free of this
trust, to such persons, corporations or institutions (not including,
however, such child's estate or creditors or the creditors of his or
her estate), and in such proportions or amounts, and upon such
trusts, if any, and such other conditions, as such child, by his or
her last will and testament specifically referring to the power of
appointment hereby conferred upon such child, shall have ap-
pointed and designated.
In the event that such child shall fail to exercise the aforesaid
power of appointment . . . [provisions follow specifying takers
in default].
III. EXERCISING BY WILL A POWER OF APPOINTMENT
Let us turn from the drafting of powers of appointment to some of
the problems involved in exercising them.
A. Determining Whether or Not to Exercise a
Testamentary Power
Logically and practically, the first problem here is that of deciding
whether or not a particular power possessed by the testator, as donee
thereof, should be exercised by his will. In some cases there may be
possible alternatives which, for tax or other reasons, should be care-
fully considered.
1. From a Tax Standpoint, Can and Should a General Power
Be Disclaimed, Released or Exercised During Lifetime or
Exercised by Will in Favor of Qualified Charity?
Many times it may be very important for a testator to disclaim, re-
lease or exercise a general power of which he is named donee in such
manner as to avoid or minimize estate taxation of the power, if this
is possible. As pointed out above,' 0 the release of a general power cre-
ated after October 21, 1942, involves gift tax liability and may involve
estate tax liability. However, there are sometimes alternative courses
when a testator possesses or is named donee of a general power which
is unwanted or undesirable from the estate tax standpoint.
80. See text at II(A) (2) supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss4/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
a. Disclaimer of Power
The Internal Revenue Code provides that disclaimer or renunciation
of a general power created after October 21, 1942, will not be con-
sidered a taxable release of the power for either estate,1 or gift8l tax
purposes. Disclaimer is an act by which an individual refuses to ac-
cept an estate, interest or power which has been given to him by
deed, will or other instrument 0 ' Disclaimer has the effect of prevent-
ing the estate, interest or power from ever vesting in the person who
disclaims it."
The Internal Revenue Code provisions raise the question of whether,
under Missouri law, a power of appointment can be disclaimed, at least
without disclaimer of all other interest in the property subject to the
power, such as a life estate given to the person who is also the donee
of the power. In Missouri, a legacy under a will may be disclaimed if
the disclaimer is made within a reasonable time after the testator's
death,85 but the writer has been unable to find any judicial precedent
in Missouri (or elsewhere) on the question of whether a disclaimer
may be made of a power of appointment as a matter of property law,
much less on the question of whether, in order to disclaim a power of
appointment, the donee of the power must also disclaim or renounce
all other interests in the property subject to the power. Presumably,
though, a power may be disclaimed as a matter of property law and
without giving up other interest in the property. However, if a
general power is to be disclaimed by the donee so as to keep it from
being considered a general power for federal estate and gift tax pur-
poses, disclaimer must be made within a reasonable time after the
donee learns of its existence, viz., within a few months.80
b. Exercise or Release of Power During Lifetime
Because the gift tax rates are lower than the estate tax rates, the
holder of a general power of appointment may be better off, tax-
wise, to exercise it .during -his lifetime, if it is exercisable during
lifetime, or to release the power during his lifetime, even if he has to
pay a gift tax upon the exercise" or release, than to have it taxed as
part of his estate at his death if he dies possessing it. This is true,
of course, only if he can exercise or release the power during life-
time in such manner as to keep the appointive property from being
81. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041 (a) (2),
82. Id. § 2514(b).
83. BLACx's LAw DIcTIoNARY 585. (3d ed. 1933).
84. Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617, 624 (Mo. 1943).
85. Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943); see Sanders v. Jones, 347
Mo. 255, 262, 147 S.W.2d 424, 427 (1941).
86. See U.S. Treas. Beg. 105, § 81.24 (1954) (estate tax, 1939 Code); U.S.
Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.20 (1954) (gift tax, 1939 Code).
87. Exercise during lifetime in favor of a qualified charity will probably
prevent any gift tax upon exercise of the power. INT. Ruv. CODE of 1954, § 2522.
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subject to estate tax as part of his estate at the time of his death,
e.g., as a transfer in contemplation of death. Exercise or release of the
power during lifetime would not prevent estate tax upon the appoin-
tive property in the event that the donee should die within three years
of the exercise or release, unless the donee's estate could sustain the
burden of proof which would be upon it to show that the exercise or
release had not been in contemplation of death.11
If the holder of the power also has a life estate in the property
subject to the power, he probably cannot prevent estate tax upon the
appointive property by exercising or releasing the power inter vivos
unless he can give up his life estate and is willing to do so.89 A spend-
thrift clause might prevent him from giving up his life estate even if
he wished to do so.
e. Exercise of Testamentary Power in Favor of Qualified Charity
Even when the donee has not disclaimed an otherwise taxable gen-
eral power or cannot or does not wish to exercise or release it inter
vivos, there may still be another "out" in some cases, if it is important
for estate tax purposes to get the appointive property out of the gross
estate of the donee. If the donee does not particularly care whether
the property goes to relatives, he can exercise the power by his will
in favor of a qualified charitable organization, so as to give his estate
a charitable deduction for the value of the appointive property °
2. Considerations in Determining Whether or Not to
Exercise a Power in Other Cases
Now let us assume that the testator does not wish to or cannot get
rid of a taxable power during his lifetime or exercise it by will in
favor of a qualified charity, or that the power is a special one and
therefore does not involve federal estate and gift tax problems for him.
There is still the question of whether to exercise the power by will
or to let the appointive property go to the takers in default. In the
case of most testators who possess testamentary powers, there are a
number of things to be considered in determining whether or not to
exercise the power.
a. Personal Considerations
Among the most important factors to be considered in making this
determination are considerations which are entirely personal to the
testator. In the case of a childless widow who has been given a power
of appointment by her husband's will, the takers in default may be
her husband's collateral relatives, and she may wish the appointive
88. Id. §§ 2035 and 2041(a) (2).
89. id. §§ 2036(a) (1) and 2041(a) (2).
90. Id. § 2055(b).
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property to go to her own relatives and therefore may wish to exercise
the power.
Conversely, a widow in these circumstances may feel morally obli-
gated not to exercise the power, feeling that the property should go
to her haisband's relatives. In another case, the takers in default of
exercise of the power may be the donees own children, and they may
take, as takers in default, in just the relative proportions that the
donee would direct if he were to exercise the power. Considerations
of this sort are, of course, entirely personal to the testator, and he
himself must make the decisions with respect to them. However,
.factors other than the personal ones sometimes enter into the decision
as to whether or not to exercise a power of appointment, and some-
times the other factors will override the personal considerations.
b. Is the Power a General One Created on or before
October 21, 1942?
The fact that the power is a general one which was created on or
before October 21, 1942, may alone be sufficient reason for the testator
not to exercise it. As noted above, exercise of a general power created
on or before that date will cause the property subject to the power to
be included in the donee's estate for federal estate tax purposes, even
if exercised in favor of persons other than the donee, his estate or
creditors. On the other hand, it will not be included in his estate if
the power is not exercisedP1
c. New Capital Gain or Loss Basis for Recipients of
Appointive Property
Until the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, another
important consideration in determining whether or not to exercise the
testamentary power involved the income tax liability of those who
would receive the appointive property, that is, the gain or loss which
they would realize when they later sold or exchanged the property.
Section 113 (a) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided,
in effect, that where property passed without a full and adequate con-
sideration under a general power of appointment exercised by will, it
took, in the hands of the recipients, a new basis for determination of
gain or loss upon later sale or exchange by them. The new basis was
the value which the property had for estate tax purposes in the estate
of the person exercising the power. Property subject to a special
power, whether exercised or not, and property passing to takers in
default of exercise of a general power retained its old basis; this basis
generally was the estate tax value of the appointive property in the
estate of the donor of the power if the power was created by will, or
the value in the hands of the donor if the power was created in his
91. See text at II(A) (2) supra, and note 33 supra.
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lifetime. The provision contained in section 113 (a) (5) of the 1939
Code has been retained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.92 The
new law has added a provision, however, not found in the old law,
giving a "stepped-up" basis in the case of a decedent dying after De-
cember 31, 1953, for
property acquired from the decedent by reason of death, form of
ownership, or other conditions (including property acquired
through the exercise or non-exercise of a power of appointment),
if by reason thereof the property is required to be included in de-
termining the value of the decedent's gross estate...
either under the estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 or under those of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.93 The new
provision contains the ambiguous qualification that it shall not apply
to "property described in any other paragraph '9 of the subsection,
which includes the provision carried over from the 1939 Code. It
appears, however, that persons receiving appointive property at the
death of the donee of a general power includible in the donee's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes will now receive a "stepped-up"
basis for the property, under the one paragraph or the other, whether
the power is exercised or not exercised.
d. Possible Increase in Fiduciaries' Commissions
Another factor in determining whether or not to exercise the power
is the possible increase in trustees' or executors' commissions resulting
from the exercise. If property held in trust is appointed to another
trust by exercise of a power, often an extra trustee's principal com-
mission will result since there will be one upon distribution by the
trustees of the trust in which the property was originally held and
another upon distribution from the trust to which the property is
appointed at the termination of that trust. Possibly, too, executors'
commissions could be increased by exercise of the power, if the prop-
erty must pass through the hands of the executors of the person exer-
cising the power. The Restatement of Property takes the position,
however, that normally there is no justification for the additional ex-
pense caused by having the executors of the donee of the power make
distribution to the appointees, since normally the trustees who held
the property prior to the exercise of the power can distribute directly
to the appointees.5
So far as Missouri powers are concerned, the writer has been in-
formed that this is the practice of the trust companies in St. Louis
and Kansas City, that is, they make distribution directly to the ap-
pointees, regardless of whether the appointments are made in trust or
92. INT. REV. COD of 1954, § 1014 (b) (4).
93. Id. § 1014 (b)(9).
94. Ibid.
9F.. REsTATEMENT, PROPMTY § 329, comment h (1940).
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outright. The trust companies normally do delay distribution, how-
ever, until the time for contest of the donee's will has elapsed, a pre-
caution which seems quite justifiable. Also, unless the right of con-
tribution for federal estate tax" has been negatived by the donee's
will, the writer understands that a corporate fiduciary will normally
delay making distribution to the appointees until it has reached some
agreement as to contribution with the executors of the donee of the
power.
e. Subjecting Appointive Property to Claims of Creditors
In some cases there may be another consideration in determining
whether or not to exercise a power. As pointed out above, the general
rule is that the one situation in which the creditors of the donee can
reach appointive property is where the power is general and is exer-
cised in favor of a person who is not a purchaser for value or in favor
of one of several creditorsV7 If there is anything in the circumstances
of the testator-client which particularly indicates that he may be in-
solvent at his death, he may not wish to exercise a general power and
thus possibly subject the property to creditors' claims, but may pre-
fer to let it go to the takers in default.
B. Drafting the Will Which is to Exercise a Testamentary Power
Let us assume, now, that the testator has decided to exercise a
power of appointment which he possesses. What are some of the
things which should be considered in drafting the will which is to
exercise that power?
1. The Rule against Perpetuities
One of the most important things to bear in mind is the Rule against
Perpetuities. The effect of this rule on the exercise of the powers is
one of the few things in the common law as to powers of appointment
on which there is some Missouri precedent. The Missouri rule appears,
from decision and dictum, to be that in determining the validity of
an appointment under a special power or under a general power to
appoint by will only, the period of the Rule against Perpetuities is
counted from the time of the creation of the power, but that in deter-
mining the validity of an appointment under a general power presently
exercisable-that is, exercisable during lifetime-the period of the
Rule against Perpetuities is counted from the time of the exercise of
the power. The general rule in the United States appears to be the
same.9 8
96. See note 115 infra.
97. See note 9 supra.
98. RESTATmwriT, PRo0RTY §§ 391 and 392 (1944).
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In St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Bassett, the testatrix had a
general power of appointment exercisable by will only, which had
been conferred upon her by the will of her father. By her will, she
exercised this power by creating a trust for several named benefici-
aries, none of whom had been living at the time of the death of her
father. The testatrix provided that the property was to be held in
trust for the named beneficiaries until they attained the age of forty,
at which time it should be distributed to them, and she further pro-
vided that if any of the named beneficiaries should die before at-
taining that age, leaving children surviving, the deceased beneficiary's
share of the income was to be paid to his or her children until the
youngest of the named beneficiaries attained the age of forty, at which
time the share of the deceased beneficiary was to be paid over to his
or her children, free of trust. The Supreme Court of Missouri held
that this exercise by the testatrix of the power of appointment vio-
lated the Rule against Perpetuities because the trust fund, under the
appointment, would not vest in the beneficiaries within the lifetime
of the testatrix and twenty-one years thereafter. In it's opinion, the
court said:
Then, in section 953, Gray says: "There is no dispute that the
exception does not extend to special powers. Now, as a practical
matter, from the point of view of the Rule against Perpetuities,
there is no difference between a testamentary general power and
a special power."
It* is sufficient here to say that the better reason and the great
weight of authority supports the views which we have quoted
from Gray, Corpus Juris, and Ruling Case Law, supra. Reaching
this conclusion, we hold that the time as affects the power of ap-
pointment as to the trust fund is to be reckoned from the time of
its creation by the father of testatrix in 1872, and not from the
time of its execution by her in 1928.10
In Rutkerfurd v. Farrar,"' the St. Louis Court of Appeals also
recognized the rule that the perpetuities period is computed from the
time of the creation of the power except in the case of a general power
exercisable during lifetime, but held valid the exercise of the power in
question, under which the donee had made an appointment in trust,
because of lack of proof that the appointees were not living at the time
of the creation of the power.
When the testator desires to make appointments under a special
power or under a general power exercisable by will only, and to have
the property held in trust for the appointees, how should the will be
drafted? Generally, in a situation of this sort, appointive property
99. 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569 (1935).
100. Id. at 624, 85 S.W.2d at 580.
101. 118 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App. 1938).
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should not be included in a residuary trust with property owned by the
donee of the power if all interests in that trust will not vest within
lives in being at the time of the creation of the power and twenty-one
years thereafter.When appointive property is included in a residuary trust, violation
of the rule will not be prevented simply by an over-all perpetuities
"saving clause" of the type commonly used in wills--to the effect that
no trust created by the will shall under any circumstances continue
for more than twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor
of those beneficiaries living at the death of the testator-donee. A
saving clause relating the duration of the residuary trust to the time
of the creation of the power would seem to be effective to prevent vio-
lation of the Rule against Perpetuities, but such a clause would often
be quite awkward or unduly restrictive upon the duration of the trust
of the donee's own property.
Instead of including appointive property in a residuary trust of the
donee's own property, the writer recommends that a testator normally
exercise a power, other than a general power presently exercisable,
by a separate item or article of his will in such manner as to prevent
violation of the Rule against Perpetuities. For example, a person
with an exclusive special power to appoint by will to his descendants
and those of the donor could use a clause something like the following:
I hereby exercise the power of appointment given me by the last
will and testament of my father ................... , dated
.--......... , so as to appoint all the property subject to
such power at the date of my death to the trustees hereinafter
named in Item ..........--- hereof, TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the
same unto them and their successors, IN TRUST, HOWEVER,
for the uses and purposes hereinafter specified and with all the
powers, rights, privileges, duties and discretions hereinafter con-
ferred upon them and their successors in trust by Item ................
hereof.
I direct the trustees to divide and set apart all the money and
other property appointed to them by this item into such number
of equal shares as shall be necessary to provide one such share
for each child of mine living at the time of my death and one such
share for the descendants then living, collectively, of each child
of mine then deceased, among whom it shall be subdivided, per
stirpes and not per capita, such shares and subdivisions to be
disposed of as follows:
(1) Each share or subdivision set apart for a child or descendant
who was not living at the death of my father shall be paid over
and distributed to him or her free of trust.(2) Each share or subdivision set apart for a child or descendant
who was living at the death of my father shall be held and re-
tained in trust by the trustees as a separate and distinct trust
estate, and the trustees shall pay over and distribute all the net
income therefrom, in quarterly installments, to the child or de-
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scendant for whom such share or subdivision was set apart, so
long as such child or descendant shall live, and upon his or her
death shall pay over and distribute, free of trust, all the money
and other property then constituting the share or subdivision set
apart for such child or descendant (a) to the then living descen-
dants of such child or descendant, per stirpes and not per capita,
or (b) if none, to my then living descendants, per stirpes and not
per capita, or (c) if none, to the then living descendants of my
father, .................---------------......, per stirpes and not per capita.
Of course, even the shares of those who were not alive at the death
of the donor could be held in trust for twenty-one years after the
donees death, though no longer, instead of being distributed outright
as provided in the illustrative clause; in fact, most testators would
probably prefer that to the outright distribution used in that clause
to keep it reasonably short. Also, the shares set apart for persons who
were alive at the death of the creator of the power would not have to
be distributed free of trust upon their deaths but could be retained
in trust for twenty-one more years, during the minority of the re-
maindermen.
There are undoubtedly many good alternative methods. One al-
ternative might be to make appointments only for the benefit of
children and other descendants living at the time of the creation of
the power and then, in the residuary trust of the testator's own prop-
erty, direct adjustments in the size of the shares of that trust so that
all beneficiaries will receive substantially equal treatment, looking
at the will as a whole.
Before leaving the subject of the Rule against Perpetuities, per-
haps some mention should be made of the fact that there are parallel
provisions in the federal estate'02 and gift 0 3 tax law dealing with the
Rule against Perpetuities which might cause some confusion unless
the reader is familiar with their background. Suffice it to say that
these provisions were aimed at the State of Delaware and are gen-
erally considered to apply only to Delaware powers. 04
2. Residuary Clauses and "Blending Clauses"
It is rather well settled in Missouri that there is no exercise of a
power of appointment by a residuary clause in the usual form, such as,
"All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and per-
sonal, of whatever kind and description and wherever situated, and
to which I am in any manner whatsoever entitled, I give, devise and
bequeath to X."'' This is not the rule, however, in some other states
102. INT. 1Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2041(a) (3).
103. Id. § 2514(d).
104. SEN. REP. No. 382, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 359 (1951) (regarding the
Powers of Appointanent Act of 1951) ; Trachtman, op. cit. supra note 55, at 167.
105. Standley v. Allen, 349 Mo. 1115, 163 S.W.2d 1012 (1942); Weiss v. St.
Louis Union Trust Company, 142 S.W.2d 1103 (Mo. App. 1940).
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which have adopted statutes providing that a residuary clause exer-
cises a power of appointment unless the testator indicates a contrary
intention.106 If the testator-donee owns real property in a state other
than Missouri, the attorney drafting his will should, of course, check
the statutes of that state.
It is the general common law rule in the United States, however,
that, except where the donor expressly requires formalities in the ex-
ercise of the power which are not observed, a "blending clause" in-
cluding in the residuary estate all property over which the testator
possesses "any power of appointment" is sufficient to exercise all
powers which the testator possesses that are exercisable by will.107
This appears to be the rule in Missouri as well.108
Blending clauses are often used in wills to take care of unknown
powers. The writer believes that this is an undesirable practice for
several reasons. For one thing, if the residuary estate is left in trust,
inclusion of appointive property may cause violation of the Rule
against Perpetuities, as pointed out above.10° Moreover, the exercise of
a general power created on or before October 21, 1942, will cause in-
clusion of the appointive property in the gross estate of the holder of
the power for federal estate tax purposes, whereas it will not be in-
cluded if the holder of such a power dies without exercising it.10
Exercise of a power by a "blending clause," therefore, could cause a
large increase in estate taxes in a case where the donee might be quite
willing to have the property go to the takers in default.
3. Observation of any Limitations upon Exercise
Imposed by the Donor
A few words seem particularly desirable with respect to special pow-
ers. In exercising a special power, the donee should be particularly
careful to observe all of the limitations placed upon the power by the
instrument creating it. The importance of making appointments to
appointees authorized by the donor and appointments of the kind per-
mitted by the special power is perhaps obvious from some of the
things mentioned in the discussion of the drafting of special powers., 1
The judicial precedents indicate, also, the importance of observing
even formal limitations upon the exercise of any power, general or
special. 1 2
106. For a list of such statutes in effect on January 1, 1947, and a discussion
of variations between such statutes, see R STATEiENT, PRopgRTY § 343, comment
d (1948).
107. RESTATEMSNT, PROPERTY § 341 (1940).
108. Cf. Collier's Will, 40 Mo. 287 (1867).
109. See text at HI (B) (1) supra.
110. See note 33 supra.
111. See text at 11(B) (2) supra.
112. Grace v. Perry, 197 Mo. 550, 567, 95 S.W. 875, 879 (1906) (by implica-
tion); see Tayler v. Tayler, 243 S.W.2d 310, 316 (Mo. 1951).
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4. Treatment of Powers Which Are Not to be Exercised
When a testator possesses a power which he does not wish to ex-
ercise, the writer suggests that the draftsman include in the will a
clause expressly so stating, particularly since it is always possible that
the testator could die domiciled in, or owning real property in, a state
where a residuary clause exercises all powers exercisable by will unless
there is a provision in the will to the contrary. 13 A clause to prevent
a contention that a residuary clause was intended to exercise a power
could be something like the following:
I do not desire or intend to exercise, by this my last will and testa-
ment, and accordingly do not exercise, (a) any general power of
appointment as defined by the Internal Revenue Code and created
on or prior to October 21, 1942, or (b) any testamentary power
of appointment granted to or conferred upon me by the last will
and testament of my --------------- , ..........................---------------....... - ,
it being my intention that all property over which I shall possess
any such power as above identified shall pass under and as pro-
vided in the instrument creating such power in the event of my
failure to exercise the same.
5. Partial Exercise of Powers to Pay Death Taxes
Section 2207 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195411, provides that,
unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, his executor shall be
entitled to contribution, for estate tax, from the persons receiving
property by reason of the exercise, non-exercise or release of a power
of appointment included in the decedent's gross estate for estate tax
purposes. The amount which the executor can recover is the propor-
tionate part of the total estate tax payment which the property sub-
ject to the power bears to the sum of the taxable estate and the $60,000
specific exemption. 11 However, there are some exceptions in the law
in the case of appointive property which has qualified for the marital
deduction in the decedent's estate. I1 G
Very often the right of contribution or reimbursement provided for
in section 2207 is negatived in wills. Sometimes, however, a person
with a general power-such as a surviving spouse for whom a marital-
deduction trust was created-may have a rather small probate estate
of her own but a large estate tax bill because of the power. For senti-
mental reasons, a surviving wife may want her own property to go to
her children so that she can feel that she has left them something,
rather than have it consumed entirely or to a great extent in paying
estate taxes attributable to property which is subject to a power of
appointment that she possesses. Even if the widow is not so senti-
113. See note 106 supra.
114. The equivalent provision in the INT. REV. CODE of 1939 was found in§ 826(d). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1635 (1954).
115. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2207.
116. Ibid.
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mental, she may not want her executors to be faced with the problem
of raising the cash necessary to pay estate taxes and then seeking re-
imbursement later under the federal statutory procedure or, for that
matter, under applicable state law.117 Or, if appointive property causes
the donee's own property to be thrown into a higher bracket and
taxed at higher rates, the donee of the power may want to have
more of the total estate taxes paid from the appointive property than
is provided for by the federal statute. In cases like these, partial
exercise of a general power to pay estate taxes may accomplish the
testator's desires, with the rest of the appointive property going to the
takers in default.1 18 The following is an illustration of a clause par-
tially exercising a taxable power for the purpose of having the estate
tax attributable to the power paid from the appointive property:
Anything in this testament to the contrary notwithstanding, any
federal estate taxes which shall be attributable to property with
respect to which I shall at the time of my death possess any testa-
mentary power of appointment shall be borne by and paid out of
such property, to the extent hereinafter provided, and I accord-
ingly hereby exercise any such testamentary power of appoint-
ment in part by directing the payment, from the property subject
thereto, of such federal estate taxes as shall be attributable to such
property, determined as hereinafter provided, such payment to be
made to my executors and to be used by them to pay such taxes,
the exact amount of such taxes attributable to any such property,
as aforesaid, to be the full amount of federal estate taxes imposed
upon my estate resulting from inclusion of such property in my
gross estate; and I direct that the determination of my executors
as to the full amount of federal estate taxes resulting from the
inclusion in my gross estate of the appointive property shall be
final and conclusive upon all persons whomsoever.
Except to the extent provided in the immediately preceding para-
graph, I do not desire or intend to exercise by this my last will and
testament any power of appointment which I may possess at the
time of my death, and I further direct that, subject to the provi-
sions of the immediately preceding paragraph, my executors shall
have no right of contribution or exoneration for any federal or
state inheritance or estate taxes paid by them in respect of any
proceeds of any policies of insurance upon my life payable to
beneficiaries other than my estate or in respect of any other prop-
erty which, by operation of law, shall be included in my estate for
federal or state estate or inheritance tax purposes.
117. Cf. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954).
118. It seems quite clear that if a power is created for the purpose of providing
funds for the payment of estate taxes, that power will constitute a general
power of appointment for federal estate and gift tax purposes. See U.S. Treas.
Reg. 105, § 81.24 (1954) (estate tax regulations, 1939 Code, providing that "a
power of appointment exercisable to meet the estate tax, and any other taxes,
debts, and charges which are enforceable against the estate, is included within
the meaning of a power of appointment exercisable in favor of the decedent's
estate or the creditors of his estate"); U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2 (1954) (gift
tax regulations, 1939 Code, containing the same provision).
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This clause does not spell out the allocation of taxes between powers
when the testator has two or more powers includible in his gross es-
tate for federal estate tax purposes, and the draftsman might wish
to make some express provision as to this.
The partial exercise of the power could also include state inheri-
tance taxes, but this becomes rather complicated because of the nature
of the inheritance tax and the varying exemptions given different
beneficiaries, depending upon their relationship to the decedent}1 9
It is for this reason that the illustrative clause is limited to federal
estate taxes.
CONCLUSION
The ancient device of the common law, the power of appointment,
with, or perhaps despite, its modern sophisticated gloss of tax rules,
can be a very useful device in will drafting and estate planning. Prop-
erly used, it can accomplish many things otherwise unattainable. It
can give flexibility in the disposition of property based upon circum-
stances as they exist long after the owner's death, without the ap-
pointive property being subjected to a second estate tax at the death
of the donee of the power or to the claims of the creditors of the donee
or dower rights of the donee's spouse. The writer submits that, in the
drafting of wills, the bar can and should use powers of appointment
far more than they have been used in the past.
119. Mo. REv. STAT., § 145.090 (1949).
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